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Abstract
Many immunization strategies have been proposed to prevent infectious viruses from
spreading through a network. In this work, we study efficient immunization strategies
to prevent a default contagion that might occur in a financial network. An essential
difference from the previous studies on immunization strategy is that we take into ac-
count the possibility of serious side effects. Uniform immunization refers to a situation
in which banks are “vaccinated” with a common low-risk asset. The riskiness of immu-
nized banks will decrease significantly, but the level of systemic risk may increase due
to the de-diversification effect. To overcome this side effect, we propose another im-
munization strategy, called counteractive immunization, which prevents pairs of banks
from failing simultaneously. We find that counteractive immunization can efficiently
reduce systemic risk without altering the riskiness of individual banks.
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Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, many researchers in various fields of nat-
ural and social sciences, such as physicists, ecologists and economists, have been tackling
the question of how to reduce financial systemic risk.1–4 Many of those studies are based
on network theory, which has been used extensively to explore complex systems since the
early 2000’s.
Percolation is one of the most frequently used concepts in thinking about the fragility
of networks. Percolation theory provides a way to reveal the threshold of the number of
removed nodes above which the giant component disintegrates.5–8 Applying this theory,
researchers examined the fragility of various types of actual complex networks, such as the
Internet, road networks, and power grids.9–11 Percolation theory also gives us some useful
insights into the question of how to control the way in which infectious viruses spread
through a network. Many studies proposed various immunization strategies to make the
percolation threshold as small as possible.6, 12–15
Systemic risk can be viewed as a fear of default contagion. Bank defaults can spread
through a financial network in a manner similar to the spread of infectious diseases through
a social network. The idea of efficient immunization would therefore give us a clue to the
question of how to reduce the likelihood of default contagion. In this work, we explore
efficient bank-immunization strategies by using a simple model of the interbank network
(see Methods).
We consider two different types of “vaccine”. One is a very-low-risk asset, possibly
government bonds or cash. Since only a few of all the types of widely traded assets are
categorized as very-low-risk assets, we assume that one such asset is used as a common
vaccine. The other vaccines are pairs of negatively correlated assets, which could be inter-
preted as opposite positions in risky assets. We assume that the riskiness of each of the
negatively correlated assets is the same as that of the uncorrelated assets that banks orig-
inally held before immunization. We call the former type uniform immunization and the
latter counteractive immunization (see Methods). Counteractive immunization does not
change the riskiness of individual banks, but Kobayashi16 showed that assigning negatively
correlated assets to highly “infective” banks would reduce systemic risk.
Even if a common vaccine is used, the effects of immunization will differ if the order of
vaccination varies. We show that the likelihood of a large-scale contagion, what is called
a financial crisis, can be reduced very efficiently if the order of immunization is based
on PageRank. At the same time, however, uniform immunization leads to an undesirable
situation in which the number of bank defaults during a crisis tends to increase as immu-
nization proceeds. In other words, uniform immunization will make the financial market
robust-yet-fragile. We also examined some different orders of vaccination that are based on
eigenvector centrality, degree centrality, node-betweenness centrality, and the eigenvector-
based index proposed by Restrepo et al.17 It turns out that the PageRank-based vaccination
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strategy is most efficient in terms of reducing the likelihood of financial crises. It is shown
that the undesirable trade-off between the likelihood and the size of a crisis does not arise
under counteractive immunization.
As an objective measure of systemic risk, we employ the χ-th moment of the number of
defaulted banks.1, 16 In addition, to see the effects of immunization on the connectivity of the
financial network, we also show the likelihood that the giant strongly connected component
(GSCC) disappears due to the removal of defaulted banks (see Methods). These two
measures are supposed to capture different aspects of the undesirable influence of bank
defaults. Nevertheless, we find that the two measures are actually closely related and
virtually coincide under a certain value of χ.
Finally, we examine under what circumstances counteractive immunization becomes
more effective than uniform immunization. We derive the threshold of the degree of social
risk aversion, χ, above which counteractive immunization becomes more advantageous than
uniform immunization.
Results
The likelihood and size of a financial crisis
Following Gai and Kapadia3, a financial crisis is defined as a situation in which at least
5% of banks go bankrupt. Fig. 1 illustrates the frequency and the conditional average of
the size of crises. Some interesting properties are observed. First, Fig. 1a reveals that the
uniform immunization strategy based on PageRank is most successful in terms of reducing
the frequency of crises. The least efficient one is random immunization. The reason for
this is that a bank with a high PageRank score generally a) has many interbank liabilities
(i.e., high in-degree) and b) borrows from lenders that have few interbank assets (i.e., low
out-degree). In this model, the fact that a bank borrows a lot means that the bank borrows
from many other banks (see Methods). Such a bank is likely to be systemically important
because its failure would undermine the balance sheets of many lenders. In addition, the
fact that the lenders of bank i have few interbank assets indicates that the lenders’ solvency
depends largely on the solvency of bank i since the lenders’ portfolios of interbank assets
are not so diversified.
Secondly, Fig. 1b states that the average number of banks that fail during a crisis
increases as more banks become immunized. This is because a larger number of banks
begin to hold a common low-risk external asset, which reduces the frequency of medium-
scale simultaneous defaults (Fig. 2a). Moreover, Fig. 1b also shows that a crisis is likely to
become more severe under the PageRank-based strategy than under the other immunization
strategies. Immunizing banks in the order based on PageRank “efficiently” increases the
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Figure 1 | The frequency and size of financial crises under alternative immunization
strategies. “Financial crisis” is defined as a situation in which at least 5% of banks go bankrupt.
The average of crisis size is taken conditional on crisis event. (a) and (b): The case of uniform
immunization. (c) and (d): The case of counteractive immunization. The outcomes of uniform
immunization based on a random vaccination order are also shown for comparison. Returns of
external risky assets follow the student t-distribution with degree of freedom 5. The probability
of fundamental default, δr, is 5/N prior to immunization. The probability of fundamental default
after uniform immunization, δs, is 1/(10N). The degree of negative correlation under counteractive
immunization, ρ, is .6.
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Figure 2 | Histogram of the number of defaulted banks. (a) Uniform immunization based on
PageRank. (b) Counteractive immunization based on edge-betweenness centrality. The figures show
that i) uniform immunization decreases the frequency of medium-scale defaults while increasing the
likelihood of extremely large-scale defaults. ii) Counteractive immunization slightly reduces the
frequency of medium-scale cascades while increasing the likelihood of small-scale defaults. See the
caption of Fig.1 for parameter values.
probability that systemically important banks will fail simultaneously, which would lead
to a crisis. In other words, the PageRank-based strategy will rapidly shift the financial
market toward a robust-yet-fragile system.
The corresponding figures for counteractive immunization are shown in Figs. 1c,d.
Counteractive immunization introduces anti-correlations between two assets that were pre-
viously independent of each other without changing the riskiness of individual assets. In
contrast to the case of uniform immunization, counteractive immunization decreases the
frequency of crises while having an unambiguous influence on the average number of bank
defaults at the time of a crisis. Assigning negatively correlated assets to pairs of connected
banks will avoid medium-scale default cascades by preventing the balance sheets of the
immunized banks from moving in sync (Fig.2b).
However, the speed at which the frequency of a crisis decreases is much slower under
counteractive immunization than under the PageRank-based uniform immunization. This
implies a trade-off between frequency and severity. The desirability of an immunization
strategy thus depends on the extent of social risk aversion, represented by parameter χ. In
the following, we clarify how the level of systemic risk under various types of immunization
strategies depends on the degree of risk aversion, χ.
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Figure 3 | The relationship between the fraction of immunized banks and the expected
costs. (a)-(d): The case of uniform immunization. The increases in the expected costs observed in
(a) reflect the de-diversification effect. The expected costs tend to become upward-sloping as the
value of χ increases. This reflects the fact that the society is becoming more risk-averse. (e)-(h):
The case of counteractive immunization. The outcome of uniform immunization based on a random
vaccination order is also shown for comparison. The shape of the curve is little affected by the value
of χ under counteractive immunization. See the caption of Fig.1 for parameter values.
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Systemic risk
Fig. 3 depicts the relationship between the fraction of immunized banks and the expected
costs under four different values of χ. Some important features should be noted. First,
under uniform immunization, the expected costs may increase even if χ = 1, where the
expected cost is equal to the average number of defaults. An intuition into why the average
number of defaults increases is that a homogenization of banks’ external assets effectively
makes the portfolio of interbank assets less diversified. If every bank has an idiosyncratic
external asset, then the holdings of multiple interbank assets contribute to portfolio diver-
sification. However, if borrowers begin to hold the same external assets as their lenders’,
then the effective degree of the lenders’ portfolio diversification will be lowered. Such an
effect, what we call the de-diversification effect, may increase the average size of default
cascades even when the risk of external assets is diminishing. On the other hand, asset har-
monization itself also has an effect of decreasing contagious defaults. This is because asset
harmonization increases the average number of banks that would fail simultaneously due
to the loss of external assets only. Thus, if the riskiness of the common asset is sufficiently
low, then asset harmonization would reduce the expected costs.
Secondly, the expected costs are more likely to become upward-sloping as χ increases.
This is because the degree of convexity of the cost function increases as χ goes up, reflecting
the fact that the society is becoming more risk-averse. For large values of χ, the possibility
of a large-scale simultaneous default turns out to be an important source of risk even
though its probability of occurrence is quite low.
In contrast, Figs. 3e-h show that counteractive immunization reduces systemic risk vir-
tually monotonically. This is because counteractive immunization can lower the likelihood
of medium-scale default cascades without causing increased asset commonality. A limita-
tion of this strategy is that it does not change the riskiness of a single external asset itself.
In fact, assigning anti-correlated assets to a pair of isolated banks can slightly lower the
probability that both of the banks will survive. To demonstrate this, suppose that the
probability of default is p for each bank and that the correlation coefficient of the asset
returns is -1. The probability that both banks will be solvent is then 1 − 2p. If asset
returns are independent, then the corresponding probability is given by (1 − p)2. Since
(1−p)2− (1−2p) = p2, it follows that counteractive immunization reduces the probability
that both banks will survive. This is why counteractive immunization may slightly increase
the expected costs in some circumstances.
Fragility of the financial network
Fig. 4 depicts the frequency with which the GSCC of the interbank network disintegrates
due to bank defaults (Supplementary Figure S1 shows the simulated percolation threshold).
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Figure 4 | The frequency with which the GSCC of the financial network disintegrates.
(a)-(c): Uniform immunization. (d) and (e): Counteractive immunization. Restrepo et al.’s method
is used to judge whether the GSCC is present or not.17 The frequency of network disintegration
is correlated closely with the expected costs under χ = 3. See the caption of Fig.1 for parameter
values.
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It turns out that uniform immunization tends to decrease the frequency of disintegration,
but there is a region in which the likelihood of disintegration is increased. This phenomenon
is observed when the de-diversification effect is most profound.
Under counteractive immunization, on the other hand, the frequency of disintegration
decreases virtually monotonically as vaccination proceeds. This is because counteractive
immunization makes it possible to reduce the frequency of medium-scale default cascades
without causing the de-diversification effects (Figs.1c,d).
We also found that the frequency of disintegration follows a trajectory of the expected
costs in the case of χ ≈ 3. This suggests that the risk of network disintegration could be
well captured by the third moment of the number of failed banks. An intuitive explanation
for this coincidence is as follows. Recall that the value of χ represents the degree of risk
aversion, which indicates to what extent simultaneous defaults are more costly than a
sequence of single defaults. If χ= 1, then there is no difference between a simultaneous
default of multiple banks and a sequence of single defaults as long as the total number
of defaulted banks is the same. This implies that the society puts an identical weight on
various sizes of collective defaults, which means that the small-scale collective defaults that
would not matter for the existence of the GSCC are cared too much. When χ = 10, on
the other hand, the society is so risk averse that it cares about infrequent but extremely
large-scale simultaneous defaults. The society thus undervalues the costs of the medium-
scale collective defaults that would still exceed the percolation threshold. Only if the value
of χ is just around 3, the society puts appropriate weights on the size of collective defaults
that would be larger than the percolation threshold.
Efficient immunization strategies
The next question is how to choose an immunization strategy. Fig.5 illustrates the expected
costs under uniform immunization relative to that under counteractive immunization. The
relative cost depends on various aspects of the model, such as distribution of asset returns,
immunization strategy, the degree of asset correlation and the riskiness of the common
low-risk asset.
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, it turns out that uniform im-
munization is more likely to be preferable as the tail of asset-return distribution becomes
thicker. Second, a decrease in δs will move the threshold value of χ rightward, which means
that a counteractive immunization becomes less attractive. Third, the degree of correlation
between anti-correlated assets may have an ambiguous impacts on the efficiency of counter-
active immunization. Fig.5e illustrates that counteractive immunization is most attractive
when ρ = .6, while this is not the case if asset returns follow a normal distribution.
A general and robust result is that uniform immunization becomes more efficient than
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Figure 5 | The expected cost under uniform immunization relative to that under coun-
teractive immunization. For each immunization strategy, expected costs are minimized with
respect to the fraction of immunized banks. (a), (b) and (c): asset returns follow a normal distri-
bution. (d), (e) and (f): asset returns follow the t-distribution with degree of freedom 5. Unless
otherwise noted, uniform immunization is based on PageRank while counteractive immunization is
based on a random order. Baseline parameters are: ρ = .6, δr = 5/N and δs = 1/(2N). The opti-
mal immunization strategy is to employ uniform immunization when χ is small and counteractive
immunization when it is large. The threshold value of χ depends on model parameters.
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counteractive immunization when χ is sufficiently small, where the degree of social risk
aversion is moderate. Counteractive immunization becomes more advantageous when χ is
large, where the possibility of large-scale simultaneous defaults is of great concern to the
society.
Discussion
Since systemic risk can be thought of as a fear of default contagion that might occur in finan-
cial markets, the previously proposed immunization strategies seem useful for preventing
financial contagion. However, a straightforward application of the previous immunization
strategies would not work if there is some possibility of serious side effects that would
prevail among vaccinated individuals.
In the case of uniform immunization, there is a good possibility that a large num-
ber of banks will fail simultaneously due to the commonality of assets. We showed that
counteractive immunization can be more useful than uniform immunization as long as the
society has a strong aversion to such serious side effects. The highest priority for the highly
risk-averse society is to avoid severe financial crises that would rarely occur, rather than
a few bank failures that would occur with high probability. Negatively correlated assets
can become useful vaccines even if the efficacy of each vaccine is lower than that of the
common vaccine that is used under uniform immunization.
These results reinforce the idea that micro-prudential policies do not necessarily add
up to a macro-prudential policy.1 From a micro point of view, it is efficient to use a
common low-risk asset when immunizing banks. From a macro point of view, however, the
best immunization strategy may be to prevent a large-scale contagion at the sacrifice of
individual failures. The effectiveness of counteractive immunization suggests that financial
networks should be fragile-yet-robust rather than robust-yet-fragile.
Methods
Systemic risk measures
There is no wide agreement about how to calculate the level of systemic risk. There are
many candidates, such as the expected number of defaulted banks, the expected economic
losses that would be caused by bank failures, and the likelihood of a large-scale default.3, 18–21
We show two intrinsically different risk measures in order to better understand what is
happening in the financial network. The first one is based on the costs that would result
from bank failures. Following Beale et al.1 and Kobayashi16, we assume that social costs
take the form C(n) = nχ, χ ∈ [1,∞), where n is the number of failed banks. The expected
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cost is thus given as
E[C] =
N∑
n=1
q(n)nχ,
where N (=1000) is the total number of banks in the financial market and q(·) is the
probability function. χ can be interpreted as the degree of social risk aversion. Notice
that if χ = 1, this is simply the average number of defaulted banks. If χ > 1, however,
simultaneous defaults of multiple banks become more costly than a sequence of single bank
failures.
Another measure is the connectivity of the network. As a measure of connectivity, we
use the simulated probability that the GSCC of the interbank network disintegrates. In
each simulation, we check whether the GSCC is kept connected after removing the failed
banks from the network. We use the method proposed by Restrepo et al.17, who showed
that the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix becomes smaller than 1 if the GSCC is
absent as long as the network has locally treelike structure.
In both of the risk measures, the size of failed banks is not explicitly taken into account.
However, this does not necessarily mean that systemic importance is the same across banks.
The extent of “infectivity” generally varies from bank to bank, depending not only on the
amount of borrowings (i.e., in-degree), but also on the topological location in the network
and the whole network structure.16 Systemic importance of individual banks will differ if
their infectivity differs even when their balance-sheet sizes are the same. The systemic risk
measures used in this study allow us to treat the systemic importance of each bank in an
agnostic manner.
Generating an interbank network
Interbank markets are directed networks. Many studies show that the degree distribution
of an interbank network follows a power law.22–26 In the present study, the algorithm that
generates an interbank network follows from Chung et al.27, 28. Their algorithm is also used
by Restrepo et al.17.
Let din and dout denote the in-degree and out-degree of a bank, respectively. The in-
degree of bank i represents the number of banks from which bank i borrows funds. The
degree distribution derived by Chung et al.’s algorithm takes the form
P (dl) ∝ dl
−β, l = in, out.
We assume that there is no degree-degree correlation. Chung et al.’s algorithm proceeds
as follows. i) Gven the parameters β, c and iˆ0, express the bank iˆ’s in-degree as din(ˆi) =
cˆi−1/(β−1) for iˆ ∈ [ˆi0, iˆ0+N ]. ii) The out-degree distribution is obtained as a random
permutation of the sequence of din(ˆi). iii) Nodes iˆ and jˆ(6= iˆ) are linked with probability
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dout(ˆi)din(jˆ)/(dN), where d is the average in- or out-degree given by the researcher. iv)
By using the condition that the total number of edges is equal to dN , it can be shown
that c = [(β − 2)/(β − 1)]dN1/(β−1) and iˆ0 = N [(d/m)(β − 2)/(β − 1)]
β−1 for a sufficiently
large N , where m denotes the maximum in-degree given by m = cˆi
−1/(1−β)
0 . m and d
must be determined in such a way that the probability of placing an edge is less than 1.
The parameter values follow from Restrepo et al.17 (except for m): β = 2.5, d = 3 and
m = 50. To eliminate the possibility that differences in the obtained results might be
due to differences in the network structure, we use one particular network structure in all
simulations.
The portfolio structure
Prior to immunization, the asset side of bank i’s balance sheet consists of interbank assets,
li, a riskless asset, bi, and a risky external asset, ai, where cov(ai, aj) = 0 for j 6= i. The
liability side of bank i’s balance sheet consists of interbank liability, p¯i, deposits, di, and net
worth, wi. The balance sheet condition implies that ai+ bi+ li = p¯i+di+wi, i = 1, . . . , N .
The amount of bank i’s borrowings from bank j is expressed as piij p¯i, where piij denotes
the relative weight of bank i’s borrowings from j, and thereby
∑
j 6=i piij = 1, i = 1, . . . , N .
The amount of bank i’s total interbank assets, li, is given by li =
∑N
j 6=i pijip¯j .
Bank i will default if
p¯i >
∑
j 6=i
pijipj + a˜i + bi − di,
where a˜i and pj stand for the ex-post values of external assets and interbank liabilities,
respectively. It should be pointed out that deposits, di, are reserved because deposits are
senior to interbank assets.
Provided that there is no loss in the interbank assets, those banks that hold a common
low-risk asset will fail with probability δs while the others will default with probability δr.
Following Beale et al.,1 asset returns are assumed to follow student’s t-distribution with
degree of freedom vs for the low-risk asset and vr for the other external assets. For those
banks with out-degree 1, the size of net worth, wo, is determined such that Fvr(−wo) =
δr or wo = −F
−1
vr (δr), where Fvr (·) is the CDF of student-t distribution with degree of
freedom vr. The unit size of the interbank asset, l¯, is given as l¯ = θlwwo, where θlw is the
predetermined ratio of interbank assets to net worth. More generally, the amount of net
worth is determined as wi = li/θlw = max(1, dout(i))l¯/θlw for i = 1 . . . N . Given wo, vs is
obtained by solving a nonlinear problem, Fvs(−wo) = δs. In the case where asset returns
follow normal distributions (i.e., vr →∞), their variances are directly adjusted according
to the probability of default, taking as given the size of net worth.
Given the unit size of interbank lending, the sizes of interbank assets and liabilities, li
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and p¯i, are given by the structure of the interbank network. To ensure that the probability
of fundamental defaults, i.e., defaults due to the loss of external assets only, is common
across banks, the size of external assets relative to the net worth, θaw, is fixed. If bank
i has so many incoming edges that its liability side would be bigger than the sum of
interbank assets and external assets, then riskless asset, bi, is imposed to adjust the asset
side. Otherwise, deposits, di, is imposed to adjust the liability side.
The parameter values are as follows: vr = 5, δr = 5/N , θlw = 3 and θaw = 7. We
use three alternative values of δs: 1/N , 1/(2N) and 1/(10N). The ratio of interbank
assets to capital is roughly consistent with the data shown by Upper.30 These parameters
indicate that the ratio of capital to total risky assets is .1 for those banks that have a
positive amount of interbank assets and 1/7 ≈ .143 for the other banks. Solving the above-
mentioned nonlinear problem yields vs = 10.930 for δs = 1/N , 15.687 for δs = 1/(2N), and
47.296 for δs = 1/(10N). Random asset returns are generated 10
5 times for each case.
The algorithm for detecting failed banks
If bank i failed, then bank i’s creditors lose k% of their credits extended to bank i. Some of
these creditors may fail due to the loss of their interbank assets. Accordingly, the creditors
of the creditors of bank i may fail as well, because they lose k% of their credits extended
to the failed banks. The spread of contagious defaults stops if it turns out that no more
banks are going to fail due to the loss of interbank assets. Following the literature, we
assume that k = 100.
Immunization strategies
Under uniform immunization, the vaccination order is based on either PageRank29 or in-
degree. PageRank, yi, is given by yi = α
∑
j Aijyj/k
out
j + β, where Aij is the (i, j)-th
element of the adjacency matrix, which takes 1 if piij > 0 and 0 otherwise. k
out
j is the
out-degree of node j. The parameter values are α = .85 and β = 1. When two or more
nodes have a tie score, we randomize the order among them.
Under counteractive immunization, we pick up a pair of banks sequentially. In the case
of the edge-betweenness-based strategy, we first select a pair of banks whose edge spanned
between the two banks takes the highest value in terms of the edge-betweenness measure.31
We remove the edges coming from and going to the selected nodes, as well as the selected
nodes themselves. In the following step, edge-betweenness centrality is recalculated, and
then the new highest-ranked edge is selected. If there are multiple edges that have the
same edge-betweenness, we randomly choose one edge among those edges. As for random
strategy, we basically randomize the vaccination order obtained by the edge-betweenness-
based strategy. The only difference is that we randomly choose a new pair of banks when
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there are multiple edges that exhibit the same edge-betweenness. In both strategies, we
randomly pick up a pair of banks from the remaining banks if there are no more edges in
the network.
The selected banks are required to hold negatively correlated external assets whose
correlation coefficient is −ρ. Any two correlated returns, {εi, εj}, i 6= j, are expressed as
{εi, εj} = {εi,−ρεi + (1− ρ)εˆj}, i 6= j,
where εs has mean zero and variance σ
2, while εˆs has mean zero and variance (1+ρ)σ
2/(1−
ρ). There is no correlation between εi and εˆj , ∀ j 6= i. Notice that the variance of each
asset return is independent of the value of ρ, which means that the riskiness of individual
assets remains unchanged.
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